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Abstract
A new modal logicD is introduced. It describes properties of provability by interpreting modality as a deductive closure operator
on sets of formulas. Logic D is proven to be decidable and complete with respect to this semantics.
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1. Introduction
The language of modal logics can be used to capture general properties of provability. Go¨del [3] suggested that
modal logic S4 specifies such properties, although he had never given a precise meaning to this statement. The well-
developed approach to describing properties of provability in the modal language, known as the logic of provability,
is based on interpreting modal formulas as statements in a theory T and interpreting the modality operator as a
provability predicate in this theory. That is, statement φ is interpreted as “φ is provable”. Solovay [9] described
provability logic of Peano Arithmetic and has proven its decidability. A review of related results can be found in [2].
Arte¨mov [1] introduced a logic of proofs — a logical system with labeled modalities in which pφ is interpreted as
“p is a proof of φ”.
In order to define provability logic of a theory T , the language of T should be sufficiently rich to express the
provability predicate. In addition, most results on the provability logic assume that theory T is powerful enough
to prove different “basic” properties of such predicate. The most common assumption is that T includes, in some
form, the language and the axioms of Peano Arithmetic. The notion of provability, of course, is not restricted to rich
theories. This paper suggests an alternative approach to provability interpretation of modal logics that puts almost no
restrictions on theory T .
Our approach is based on the set-theoretical interpretation of propositional logic that maps the propositional
connectives conjunction ∧, disjunction ∨, and negation ¬ into the set operations intersection ∩, union ∪, and
complement Σ , where Σ is some universe. It is a well-known observation that a formula is provable in the classical
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propositional logic if and only if for any choice of universe Σ and for any interpretation of propositional variables as
subsets of Σ , the value of the formula is the entire universe.
Several possible extensions of the classical logic by modal operators corresponding, under the above set semantics,
to additional set operations have been considered before. McKinsey and Tarski [5] established that if the universe U
is a topological space, then modal logic S4 describes properties of the interior operator. If the universe U is the set
of all words in some alphabet, then properties of the logical connectives corresponding to product and star operations
are axiomatized by Interval Temporal Logic [6]. In [7], the author describes an extension of the classical propositional
logic by binary modalities, corresponding to the operations disjoint union and Cartesian product, and in [8] the binary
modality, corresponding to the type of partial recursive functions.
In this paper, we investigate modal logic defined by the deductive closure operator. That is, we assume that the
universe Σ is a set of statements in the language of theory T . Then we can interpret the modality  as the deductive
closure operator in the universe Σ with respect to provability in theory T . The set of all modal formulas whose
interpretation is equal to the entire universe Σ , no matter what the choice of the universe and the interpretation of
propositional variables are, will be called the logic of deductive closure of theory T .
Defined in such a way, the logic of deductive closure is not quite typical modal logic, because it does not contain
the modal distributivity axiom (φ → ψ) → (φ → ψ). Thus, one would not expect it to have any reasonable
Kripke semantics. Yet, we will be able to provide a finite, sound, and complete Kripke-style semantics for this logic.
The logic of deductive closure is not meant to replace the logic of provability, but rather to complement it. Those
two logics use modal language to capture different kinds of properties of provability. While the logic of provability
deals with reflection — the ability of theory T to reason about itself, the logic of deductive closure focuses on
properties of deductive closure as a set operation.
Throughout the rest of the paper we assume that T is just the classical propositional logic. Logics of deductive
closure for some other deductive systems are briefly discussed in the conclusion.
2. Language
Definition 1. The languageL of the logic of deductive closure consists of propositional variables, boolean connectives
→ and ⊥, and modality .
As usual, ¬φ and φ ∨ ψ are considered to be abbreviations for φ → ⊥ and (¬φ) → ψ correspondingly. We use
letters p, q, . . . to denote propositional variables of L and letters φ,ψ, χ, . . . to represent formulas of L. In addition,
we will consider modality-free language L0 of the classical propositional logic. Letters a, b, . . . denote propositional
variables of L0 and letters α, β, γ, . . . stand for formulas of L0.
Definition 2. Let Σ be a set of statements in language L0. A Σ -valuation is an arbitrary map ∗ of propositional
variables of language L into subsets of set Σ .
We also will be dealing with boolean valuations of formulas in language L0. The symbol  will be used for such
valuations.
Definition 3. An arbitrary Σ -valuation ∗ could be extended on all formulas in L as follows:
(1) ⊥∗ = ∅,
(2) (φ → ψ)∗ = Σ (φ∗) ∪ ψ∗,
(3) (φ)∗ = {α ∈ Σ | φ∗ 
 α}, where 
 denotes provability in the classical propositional logic.
3. Axioms
Definition 4. In addition to classical propositional tautologies and the Modus Ponens inference rule, logic of deductive
closure D contains the following axioms and inference rules:
◦ reflexivity: φ → φ,
◦ transitivity: (φ ∨φ) → φ,
◦ monotonicity: φ→ψφ→ψ .
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We will write 
D φ to state that φ is provable in D. At the same time, the notation Γ 
 α will refer to provability of
α in the classical propositional logic from a list of hypotheses Γ .
Theorem 1. If 
D φ, then for any interpretation ∗ over an arbitrary set of statements Σ , φ∗ = Σ .
Proof. Induction on the size of the derivation in D. Soundness of the classical propositional tautologies as well as
that of Modus Ponens are trivial. We will show soundness of the reflexivity and transitivity axioms and monotonicity
inference rule:
(1) If α ∈ φ∗, then φ∗ 
 α. Thus, α ∈ (φ)∗.
(2) Suppose that α ∈ ((φ ∨ φ))∗. Hence, α is provable from the union of φ∗ and all theorems derivable from φ∗.
Thus, α should be provable from φ∗ only. Therefore, α ∈ (φ)∗.
(3) Let (φ → ψ)∗ = Σ . Hence, φ∗ ⊆ ψ∗. Thus, {α ∈ Σ | φ∗ 
 α} ⊆ {α ∈ Σ | ψ∗ 
 α}. Then, (φ)∗ ⊆ (ψ)∗.
Therefore, (φ → ψ)∗ = Σ . 
4. Kripke-style model
Usually, Kripke-style semantics is considered only for so-called normal1 modal logics. Although D is not normal,
in this section we will be able to define some kind of Kripke-style semantics for D and prove its soundness and
completeness with respect to this semantics. This result will be used later to show completeness of D with respect to
the deductive closure semantics defined above.
Definition 5. The Kripke model is a triple 〈W,,〉, where W is a set of “possible worlds”,  is an “accessibility”
relation between elements of W and subsets of W , and  is a “forcing” relation between elements of W and
propositional variables of L. Relation  is assumed to have the following two properties:
(1) reflexivity: if x ∈ Y , then x  Y ,
(2) transitivity: if x  Y and y  Z for all y ∈ Y , then x  Z .
Definition 6. Relation  can be extended to the relation between worlds and arbitrary L formulas as follows:
(1) w  ⊥,
(2) w  φ → ψ if and only if w  φ or w  ψ ,
(3) w  φ if and only if ∃V (w  V ∧ ∀v ∈ V (v  φ)).
Note that, in the above definition, if w ∅, then w  φ for any modal formula φ.
Lemma 1. For any world w of a Kripke model 〈W,,〉 and any two subsets X and Y of W, if w  X and X ⊆ Y ,
then w  Y .
Proof. By the reflexivity of relation , we have x  Y for any x ∈ X . Thus, the transitivity of relation  implies that
w  Y . 
Theorem 2. Let φ be an arbitrary modal formula. If 
D φ, then w  φ for any world w ∈ W of a Kripke model
〈W,,〉.
Proof. Induction on the length of derivation inD. The cases of classical propositional logic tautologies and the Modus
Ponens inference rule are trivial. We will only consider modal axioms and inference rules of logic D.
To show that w  φ → φ, assume that w  φ. Consider V = {w}. By the reflexivity of relation , we have
w  V . At the same time, ∀v ∈ V (v  φ). Thus, w  φ.
To show that w  (φ∨φ) → φ, suppose that w  (φ∨φ). Thus, there is a subset V ⊆ W such that wV
and ∀v ∈ V (v  φ ∨ φ). In other words, ∀v ∈ V (v  φ or v  φ). It has been shown in the previous paragraph
that formula φ → φ is forced in every world of any Kripke model. Hence, ∀v ∈ V (v  φ). By Definition 6,
∀v ∈ V ∃Xv(v  Xv ∧ ∀x ∈ Xv(x  φ)). (1)
1 For a definition, see, for example [4].
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Note that ∀x ∈ Xv(x  φ) implies that Xv ⊆ {y ∈ W | y  φ}. Thus, by Lemma 1, Statement (1) implies that
∀v ∈ V (v  {y ∈ W | y  φ}). Hence, by the transitivity of relation , we have w  {y ∈ W | y  φ}. Therefore, by
Definition 6, w  φ.
Finally, we will show that if formula φ → ψ is forced in every world of the Kripke model, then w  φ → ψ .
Suppose that w  φ. Then there is a subset V of W such that w  V and ∀v ∈ V (v  φ). Since φ → ψ is forced in
every world, ∀v ∈ V (v  ψ). Therefore, w  ψ . 
Definition 7. The Kripke model 〈W,,〉 is finite if set W is finite.
Theorem 3. If D φ, then there is a finite Kripke model 〈W,,〉 and a world w0 of this model such that w0  φ.
Proof. Assume that D φ. Let S be the set of all subformulas of φ and
S¯ = S ∪ {¬φ | φ ∈ S}.
Let W be the set of all maximalD-consistent subsets of S¯. We define wV if for any ψ such that ¬ψ ∈ w there
is a v ∈ V such that ¬ψ,¬ψ ∈ v. Let also w  p be true if and only if p ∈ w.
Lemma 2. Triple 〈W,,〉 is a finite Kripke model.
Proof. Set W ⊆ 2S¯ is finite. To show that relation  is reflexive, assume that x ∈ Y and ¬ψ ∈ x ; then, by the
maximality of set x and the reflexivity axiom, ¬φ ∈ x . Thus, x  Y .
To show that relation  is transitive, suppose that x  Y and y  Z for all y ∈ Y . We will show that x  Z . Indeed,
if ¬ψ ∈ x , then there is an element y0 ∈ Y such that ¬ψ ∈ y0. Thus, there is an element z0 ∈ Z such that
¬ψ,¬ψ ∈ z0. Therefore, x  Z . 
Lemma 3. For any ψ ∈ S and x ∈ W, if ψ ∈ x, then there is a set of worlds Y such that x  Y and ψ ∈ y for
any y ∈ Y .
Proof. First, we will show that for any (¬χ) ∈ x , the set {¬χ,¬χ,ψ} is consistent, by contradiction. If

D ψ → χ ∨ χ , then by the monotonicity rule, 
D ψ → (χ ∨ χ). Taking into account the transitivity
axiom, we get 
D ψ → χ . Therefore, x is not consistent.
For any (¬χ) ∈ x consider the set yχ which is a maximal D-consistent extension of set {¬χ,¬χ,ψ}. We are
only left with noticing that x  {yχ | (¬χ) ∈ x}. 
Lemma 4. For any ψ ∈ S and any w ∈ W,
ψ ∈ w ⇐⇒ w  ψ.
Proof. Induction on the structural complexity of formula ψ . The cases when ψ is ⊥ or a propositional variable follow
from Definition 6 and the definition of  on propositional variables.
(1) Let ψ ≡ ψ1 → ψ2. (⇒) : If w  ψ1 → ψ2 then w  ψ1 and w  ψ2. By the induction hypothesis, ψ1 ∈ w and
ψ2 /∈ w. Since w is consistent, ψ1 → ψ2 /∈ w. (⇐) : Assume that w  ψ1 → ψ2. Thus, (w  ψ1) ∨ (w  ψ2).
By the induction hypothesis, (ψ1 /∈ w) ∨ (ψ2 ∈ w). By the maximality of w, φ1 → φ2 ∈ w.
(2) Suppose ψ ≡ χ . (⇒) : If χ ∈ w then, by Lemma 3, there is Y ⊆ W such that w  Y and χ ∈ y for every
y ∈ Y . By the induction hypothesis, y  χ for all y ∈ Y . Thus, by Definition 6, w  χ . (⇐) : Assume that
χ /∈ w. Since w is maximal, ¬χ ∈ w. Thus, by the definition of , for any Y such that w Y there is a y ∈ Y
such that ¬χ ∈ y. By the induction hypothesis, this means that for any Y such that w Y there is y ∈ Y such that
y  χ . This, by Definition 6, implies that w  χ . 
We are ready to finish the proof of Theorem 3. Let w0 be a maximal D-consistent extension of the set {¬φ}. By
Lemma 4, w0  φ. 
Corollary 1. Logic D is decidable.
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5. Fixed point theorem
In this section we establish a technical result concerning classical propositional logic, which will later be used to
convert a Kripke model of D into a Σ -valuation.
Definition 8. For any two boolean functions f, g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, let f ≤ g mean that f (x1, . . . , xn) ≤
g(x1, . . . , xn) for any set of boolean arguments (x1, . . . , xn).
Definition 9. Boolean function f is monotonic if f (x1, . . . , xn) ≤ f (y1, . . . , yn) for any two sets of boolean
arguments (x1, . . . , xn) and (y1, . . . , yn) such that xi ≤ yi for any i = 1, . . . , n.
Definition 10. Boolean function f (x1, . . . , xn) is xi -sufficient if
f (x1, . . . , xi−1, 1, xi+1, . . . , xn) ≡ 1.
Every propositional formula α in the language L0 represents a boolean function. We denote this boolean function
as α¯. We will use names of propositional variables in α as names of arguments of the function α¯.
Theorem 4. Let β1(a1, . . . , an), . . . , βn(a1, . . . , an) be L0 formulas. If for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} function β¯i is
monotonic and ai -sufficient, then there are propositional formulas γ1, . . . , γn such that
(1) 
 γi ↔ βi [γ1/a1, . . . , γn/an], for any i = 1, . . . , n,
(2) if  is such a boolean valuation that ∀i(βi = ai ), then ∀i(γ i = ai ).
Proof. Let us define formulas γ ki for k = 0, . . . and i = 1, . . . , n as follows:
γ ki =
{
ai if k = 0
βi [γ k−11 /a1, . . . , γ k−1n /an] if k > 0.
Lemma 5. γ¯ ki ≤ γ¯ k+1i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 0 ≤ k.
Proof. Induction on k.
(1) If γ¯ 0i (a1, . . . , an) = 1, then, by the definition of γ 0i , ai = 1. Thus, by the definition of γ ki and taking into account
that β¯i is an ai -sufficient boolean function, we have
γ¯ 1i (a1, . . . , an) = β¯i (a1, . . . , ai−1, 1, ai+1, . . . , an) = 1.
(2) If γ¯ ki ≤ γ¯ k+1i for any i then, by the monotonicity of β¯i ,
β¯i (γ¯
k
1 , . . . , γ¯
k
n ) ≤ β¯i (γ¯ k+11 , . . . , γ¯ k+1n ).
Therefore, γ¯ k+1i ≤ γ¯ k+2i . 
Since the domain of boolean functions γ¯ ki is finite, it follows from the above lemma that all but the first finitely
many elements of the infinite chain γ¯ 0i ≤ γ¯ 1i ≤ · · · are equal as boolean functions. Let us consider such a k0 that
γ¯
k0
i = γ¯ k0+1i for any i = 1, . . . , n. Since any two propositional formulas representing the same boolean function are
provably equivalent in the classical propositional logic, 
 γ k0i ↔ γ k0+1i for any i = 1, . . . , n. Let γi = γ k0i ; then, by
the definition of γ ki ,

 γi ↔ βi [γ1/a1, . . . , γn/an] for any i = 1, . . . , n.
Therefore, the first claim of Theorem 4 is established. Now let  be some boolean valuation of propositional variables
such that βi = ai .
Lemma 6. For any i = 1, . . . , n and any k = 0, 1, . . .,
(γ ki )
 = ai .
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Proof. Induction on k. If k = 0, then γ ki is ai and the statement of the lemma is trivially true. If k > 0, then, taking
into account the induction hypothesis,
(γ ki )
 = (βi (γ k−11 , . . . , γ k−1n )) = β¯i ((γ k−11 ), . . . , (γ k−1n )) = β¯i (a1, . . . , an) = βi .
Finally, since βi = ai , we have (γ ki ) = ai . 
It follows from the above lemma that (γ k0i ) = ai for any i = 1, . . . , n. Thus, (γi ) = ai . This completes the
proof of Theorem 4. 
6. Completeness
This section concludes the proof of logic D’s completeness with respect to the deductive closure semantics. It is
done by converting a Kripke model into a Σ -valuation, where the set of propositionsΣ is constructed using the Fixed
Point Theorem of the previous section.
Theorem 5. If D φ, then there is a finite set of propositional formulas Σ and a Σ -valuation ∗ such that φ∗ = Σ .
Proof. Assume that D φ. By Theorem 3, there is a finite Kripke model 〈W,,〉 such that w0  φ for some
w0 ∈ W . We will identify a unique propositional variable aw with every world of this model. Let us consider
propositional formulas {βw | w ∈ W } such that
βw =
∨
wV
∧
v∈V
av.
Lemma 7. For any w ∈ W, boolean function β¯w is monotonic. 
Lemma 8. For any w ∈ W, boolean function β¯w is aw-sufficient.
Proof. If (aw) is true, then so is (
∧
v∈{w} aw). By the reflexivity of ,( ∨
wV
∧
v∈V
av
)
is also true. 
By Theorem 4, there are propositional formulas {γw | w ∈ W } such that

 γw ↔
∨
wV
∧
v∈V
γv (2)
∀ 
(
∀w
(
aw =
( ∨
wV
∧
v∈V
av
))
→ ∀w(γ w = aw)
)
. (3)
Lemma 9. x  Y if and only if {γy | y ∈ Y } 
 γx .
Proof. (⇒) : If x  Y then, according to equivalence (2), 
∧y∈Y γy → γx . Thus, {γy | y ∈ Y } 
 γx . (⇐) : Assume
that ¬(x  Y ). Consider the boolean valuation  of propositional variables such that az is true if and only if z  Y . To
show that {γy | y ∈ Y }  γx , it will be sufficient to show that γ y is true for all y ∈ Y and that γ x is false.
Proposition 1. For any world w ∈ W,
aw =
( ∨
wV
∧
v∈V
av
)
.
Proof. First, if aw is true then, by the definition of , w  Y . By the reflexivity of , y  Y for all y ∈ Y . Thus,
(
∧
y∈Y ay) is true. Since w  Y , (
∨
wV
∧
v∈V av) is also true. Second, if (
∨
wV
∧
v∈V av) is true, then there
is some V0 such that w  V0 and (
∧
v∈V0 av)
 is true. In other worlds, av is true for all v ∈ V0. By the definition of
, this means that v  Y for all v ∈ V0. Thus, by the transitivity of , w  Y . Therefore, by the definition of , aw is
true. 
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Let us go back to the proof of Lemma 9. Taking into account Proposition 1 and implication (3), it would be
sufficient to show that ay is true for all y ∈ Y and ax is false. The first statement is true by the definition of 
and the reflexivity of . The second statement follows from the assumption ¬(x  Y ) and the definition of . 
Definition 11. Let Σ = {γw | w ∈ W } and ∗ be such a Σ -valuation that p∗ = {γw | w  p}.
Lemma 10. w  ψ if and only if γw ∈ ψ∗.
Proof. Induction on the structural complexity of ψ . The case when ψ is a propositional symbol immediately follows
from Definition 11. The case when ψ is symbol ⊥ follows from Definitions 6 and 3.
(1) Assume that ψ is ψ1 → ψ2. By Definition 6, w  ψ is equivalent to (w  ψ1)∨(w  ψ2), which, by the induction
hypothesis, is equivalent to γw ∈ (ψ∗1 ) ∪ ψ∗2 . The latter, by Definition 3, is equivalent to γw ∈ (ψ1 → ψ2)∗.
(2) Suppose that ψ is χ . (⇒) : If w  χ , then there is V such that w  V and v  χ for any v ∈ V . Thus,
by Lemma 9, {γv | v ∈ V } 
 γw and, by the induction hypothesis, γv ∈ χ∗ for any v ∈ V . Hence, χ∗ 
 γ .
Therefore, by Definition 3, γw ∈ (χ)∗. (⇐) : If γw ∈ (χ)∗, then, by Definition 3, χ∗ 
 γw . Thus, by Lemma 9,
w  {v | γv ∈ χ∗}. By the induction hypothesis, w  {v | v  χ}. Hence, by Definition 6, w  χ . 
The statement of Theorem 5 follows from the above lemma and the assumption w0  φ. 
7. Conclusions
We have introduced a modal logic D describing deductive closure properties of the classical propositional logic,
gave its complete axiomatization, and proved its decidability. It is clear that the same proof can be carried out for the
classical predicate calculus. A description of modal logic of deductive closure for other logical systems remains an
open question. One would think that the same logicD describes deductive closure properties of an intuitionistic logic,
but the proof, given in this paper, cannot be easily extrapolated to cover this case. Even more interesting are the cases
of linear and non-monotonic logics whose modal logics of deductive closure are clearly different from D.
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